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The responsibilities which civil engineers, and particularly the engineer of record, accept are considered. 
The interaction with other decision makers such as the owner, stakeholders, the law and contractors results 
in complexity that can be partially resolved by the introduction of protocols in the form of regulations and 
codes of practice. However, uncertainty always exists and can result in surprises that can produce both 
beneficial and bad results. The sections entitled the cast, protocols and reality, advocacy and surprise, and 
complexity cover these topics. The nature of responsibility is analysed. Professional engineers work within 
an increasingly complex environment and have a responsibility to acquire and use skills beyond those 
applicable to traditional technical issues. 
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1. Introduction.  
 
 
Examples of decision-making are included in judicial verdicts, medical prescriptions and 
in military combat. It is a common characteristic of professional life. In a formal 
circumstance decisions are made deliberately in response to posed situations or to 
ongoing situations where they are immediate responses to ongoing circumstances. Of 
particular interest here are decisions made with respect to civil engineering work. For 
instance in structural engineering, decisions to be made include whether or not to build a 
bridge, the geometry and type of structure to be adopted, the technical design, the 
selection of contractor, construction activities, revisions, acceptance and operation. In 
each of these decision modes responsibility has to be accepted by various named 
individuals and organisations. Thus owners, stakeholders and public authorities are 
decision participants where the engineering views may be subsidiary to the main 
concerns, whereas the engineers and contractors have much more focused engineering 
worries. 
 
Decisions punctuate the process leading from an initial idea to a finished and functioning 
artefact. The interlinked decisions occurring during the process provide a framework 
within which the various activities are carried out. Decision-making is central to 
planning, design and construction, and thus it is essential to the success of the project that 
decision-making is done well. This is not always the case. Almost all major structural 
failures can be shown to result ultimately from poor decisions. To be sure, major failures 
are few in number. However, poor decision-making also leads to less spectacular though 
costly inefficiencies. This paper is a contribution towards the making of better engineering decisions. In particular it focusses on that aspect of decision-making 
revolving around responsibility and responsibilities – the two are not the same, as will be 
explained below. Other aspects of engineering decisions are reviewed in two companion 
papers (Elms and Brown 2012; Brown and Elms 2012). 
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Fig. 1   Responsibilities and decisions  
Fig. 1 shows a plausible, but not generic, example of a decision scheme applied to a civil 
engineering project. This scheme is intended to result in an operational facility. 
Responsible parties are shown on the left, with major decisions in the centre column and 
resulting actions on the right. The responsible parties or actors are of two sorts. Those 
designated (A) to (E) are the decision-makers and are shown connected to the decisions 
for which they are responsible. The decisions are either positive or negative (Y or N), and, 
in either case, result in activities. The second set of actors, shown in italics, are mainly 
advisory participants. They have input to and influence on the activities resulting from the 
decisions. These inputs can be opinions, as in the case of stakeholders and owner, 
professional knowledge provided by the engineer of record, and the actual construction by 
the contractor. By providing these inputs responsibilities are accepted. In some cases they 
will have primary responsibility for carrying out the actions. The arrows from 
Responsibility to Activity record this input. The responsible professional engineer, at least 
in an advisory capacity, will be evident at all stages in such a scheme. Many of these 
interactions will produce material needed to proceed with each decision. The civil 
engineer should anticipate being involved with the public, through the legal and political 
system, as well as the owner and stakeholders. 
 
As well as determining the framework that meets the objectives, efforts must be made to 
identify hidden consequences that may affect the resilience and robustness of the project. 
Only by this critical approach can the objectives be attained. These objectives can be 
realized by various possible actions, which, in turn, produce new states with their 
associated consequences that can be characterized by the risks involved. Decisions 
provide answers to the questions posed by these procedures. They are choices amongst the 
possible actions that meet the objectives in a satisfactory or possibly optimal way, satisfy 
the constraints, and do not result in undesirable, unintended consequences. 
 
The scheme in Fig. 1 indicates that the origin of the decision problems changes throughout 
the undertaking. Thus the establishment of goals (B) by the owners occurs in a different 
environment from the design by the engineer of record (D). Different decision makers are 
in place and the considerations provided by background activities have different 
emphases. However, there are varying forms of civil engineering input necessary at each 
level of decision-making. The professional input changes as the work progresses and the 
manner of decision-making may be dictated by calculations, experience, or at the other 
extreme, by an accepted protocol or code of practice. 
 
Of particular concern is the successful involvement of the civil engineering professional as 
the process illustrated in Fig. 1 proceeds. The next section, The Cast, examines the 
various actors with whom the engineer of record may have to engage. A distinctive feature 
of civil engineering is that every facility, structure or scheme is considered to be unique 
and yet there are common standards that exist which are often legally binding. These 
standards are contained in codes of practice and other protocols. Although usually 
appropriate, these standards are often limited and have to be augmented and broadened by 
experience. The section Protocols and Realities provides a discussion of these matters. 
The input into this discussion will come from interested factions such as stakeholders and the owner, (B) and (D) in Fig. 1, as well as from the engineer of record, (C). The section 
Advocacy and Surprise considers these sources and the possible pertinence of the 
opinions. A main thrust of this work is to establish the realities of the environment within 
which civil engineers will make decisions. The section on Complexity explores this 
aspect of the making of decisions. In this way the background is established for 
considering the decision making and responsibilities of practicing engineers. Finally the 
section on Responsibility examines issues involved in being responsible, and having 
responsibilities. 
 
The aim in this paper is to consider the place and nature of the responsibilities of 
professional civil engineers in a scheme such as proposed in Fig. 1. The emphasis is on the 
broader professional objective to change the existing world and not just to describe the 
work environment. The major conclusion is that the civil engineer requires a sensitivity 
and understanding of issues beyond those provided in the usual technical education if a 
responsible role in professional decision making is to occur. 
 
 
2.  The Cast 
 
 
Figure 1 indicates the various interactions that may be necessary in a scheme for a facility 
that involves civil engineering. The main concern in this study is the part played by the 
engineer of record. This title identifies the responsible person with respect to the owner. 
The engineer of record acts for the owner with respect to engineering matters and, by 
signature, is responsible for these matters. If buildings are involved then the leading role 
will usually be played by the architect. The engineer of record, in common with other 
professional engineers such as those involved in environmental control and elevators, will 
be a creature of the architect. Inevitably the civil engineer of record will interact with these 
and with lawyers and business managers who represent the owner. The engineer of record 
will be aided by assistant engineers and by specialists, such as geotechnical engineers. 
 
Stakeholders will certainly include government agencies. Much of the interaction will 
involve satisfying legal requirements and other obligations. These dealings with 
government bureaucracies are obligatory and a usual part of professional life of the 
engineer of record. Other stakeholders provide viewpoints that may be different to those 
of the owner. The interaction here is with citizen groups, other professional engineers, 
lawyers, business activists and individuals. The engineer of record has the responsibility 
of determining and explaining the civil engineering consequences of these often 
conflicting views to the owner. 
 
The contractor is selected from competitors on the basis of cost or, in some professional 
and social environments, on the basis of special associations and competencies. When 
selected on the basis of the bid price the engineer of record has to maintain a continuing 
relationship, as the representative of the owner, until the acceptance of the completed 
facility. Inevitably changes from the bid design will be necessary and have to be agreed 
with the contractor. These are usually technical in nature and involve revealed differences as well as requested changes to account for the equipment and experience of the 
contractor. 
 
 
3.  Protocols and realities 
 
 
Much that is completed in the activities associated with decisions (C), (D) and (E) in Fig. 
1 invoke protocols such as codes of practice that establish necessary targets that must be 
attained if the finished facility is to be satisfactory. Protocol requirements are attained by 
the use of procedures, which are forms of models. They can be as simple as a checklist 
used by a technician to determine whether definite requirements have been completed, to 
as complicated as the complex and often difficult calculations needed to ascertain that 
technical code provisions have been satisfied. Confidence is placed in the protocols and 
procedures: they are intended to ensure that facilities perform according to the objectives 
and at safety levels that are professionally and socially acceptable. However, 
overconfidence has been known to lead to hubris (Sibly and Walker 1977) and an 
unprofessional attitude to responsibilities. The consequences can be calamitous. 
 
The dire picture sketched is not the normal outcome in civil engineering work. The 
protocols are nearly always sufficient to ensure that the finished projects are successful, 
and the process can be termed satisfactory. It may not be the best of all possible solutions, 
but it will be a satisfactory one. Although it is claimed that each civil engineering project 
is unique, there are common features that ensure that the protocols and procedures 
continue to be successful. The common and continuing features include objectives, 
materials, geometries, environments and uses. Under these continuing circumstances there 
is a tendency to believe that the protocols and models replicate reality. However, it is 
when these features change that the protocols and procedures are most vulnerable. It is 
then that it is necessary to understand the real situation and perhaps develop more 
appropriate models (Elms and Brown 2011, 2012). Protocols provide constraints either 
explicitly as in the case of codes or implicitly in the manner of contemporary practice. 
 
Many contemporary specifications for structural design employ the language of 
probability. The literature consistently cautions that these probabilities are nominal and 
therefore should not be confused with the actual chance of an event occurring. Indeed 
studies that attempt to determine the actual failure rate of structures show that these 
nominal probability values are two or three orders of magnitude smaller than the real 
occurrences. The difference occurs due to different underlying models; it is not entirely 
due to the unrealistic character of the nominal values (Melchers 2007, Brown et al. 2008) 
which may in fact be correct with respect to technical issues. However most failures are 
due to reasons that are beyond the usual domain of technical considerations. The model 
used in the preparation of specifications has a technical and narrower focus than that 
considered when all failure states are involved. Be that as it may, the failure rate of typical 
structures is socially acceptable and the protocol provided by specifications is appropriate. 
It has been argued (Nethercot 2008) that the complications in understanding required by 
specifications based on nominal probability considerations do not invite professional use and that non-reliability based protocols are more widely employed. As far as design 
outcomes are concerned it is not likely to matter in as much as the probability based codes 
(or protocols) were calibrated against the safety levels achieved by earlier deterministic 
ones. Thus there are available parallel design protocols that are applicable to an 
identifiable class of structure (precast, reinforced concrete high rise construction in non-
seismic locations for instance) with satisfactory results. Only when real evidence conflicts 
with this sense of optimism is the protocol and its underlying model re-examined. An 
example is the real evidence provided by the partial collapse of the 24 storey Ronan Point 
apartment block in London in 1968 (Griffiths et al 1968).  The failure was initiated by a 
gas explosion in an eighteenth floor corner apartment that blew out an exterior load-
bearing wall. The resulting collapse killed four and injured seventeen residents. The 
reality of professional interest was not the middle aged cake maker lighting her oven, but 
the level of internal pressure that can exist in residential construction and the progressive 
collapse that can be initiated in structures.  The existing model was clearly inappropriate 
and as a result the attention of specification writers was directed to these matters. 
Contemporary codes address these additional features. There is a critical question for the 
engineer of record: how can unjustifiable confidence in accepted protocols be avoided? 
 
Protocols are established to provide security to the designer and to ensure the integrity of 
that class of structure. The viewpoint is of examining the safety level (S) rather than 
failure (F) with the presumption that the normality axiom of probability theory, namely, 
 
       P(F)  =  1 – P(S)            (1) 
 
applies and that a safety level, S, ensures a failure rate of P(F). However, the underlying 
model does not match reality. These probabilities are nominal and the equivalence will not 
apply when the actual situation is outside the range of applicability of the protocol. This 
was recognized by Stephens (1998) when considering the inadvertent launch of nuclear 
tipped ballistic missiles. When the attention was exclusively on safety, as displayed in 
protocols, the failure rate, based on Equation. (1), was acceptably low. However a 
concentration on what could go wrong, as opposed to what had been provided to improve 
safety, produced an ominous picture. Essentially, concentrating on F and constructing 
realistic scenarios could, in this case, avoid the misuse of protocols. The engineer of 
record would have to think about the project in a different way from the designer and ask 
the question “What could happen?” as opposed to “Is the safety level that of the 
protocol?”. On these technical matters the engineer of record has to view the project with 
different eyes from those of the project engineers. Protocols usually consider the safety of 
elements or subststems within a system and not the total system. The engineer of record 
has to adopt a wider model. As well as ensuring that both element and system safety exist, 
a holistic view of the project must be adopted. 
 
In the cases cited the engineer of record acts in a narrow, professional capacity; the 
concerns are with technical topics and an interaction with a wider community is seldom 
required. When interactions occur with owners, stakeholders, advocates, lawyers and 
others the engineer of record has to have developed views that may be beyond the 
technical. The decisions in (A) and (B) in Fig. 1 depend on human, social, judicial and political views as well as physical reality. However, whatever their outcomes these 
external views can affect the effectiveness of protocols.. 
 
The public discourse concerning the consequences of any civil engineering project can 
lead to changes in the goals and objectives. The technical consequences of these changes 
have to be explained to others. This requires a communication model that shows 
sensitivity to others engaged in the discussion. However, victory in the technical sense 
may be elusive. Unambiguous decisions are available in legal verdicts (Heiberg 2007) 
Such cases are clear cut but more  often adjustments have to be made to the objectives that 
affect civil engineering activities and decision-making. These adjustments may make the 
previously accepted design protocol inapplicable. It has been suggested (Brown 1960) that 
by changing specifications to be less safe more structures could be built for the same 
money. This simplistic view has been studied (Sanchez-Silva and Rosowsky 2008) with 
respect to prescribed safety levels in developing countries,. In addition to technical 
matters, economic and cultural issues of a local nature were introduced into the scheme. 
This informed discussion places the subsequent structural design into a different context 
from that in the developed world. One word that appears frequently in these broader 
discussions is “sustainability”. This is a reminder of the changing objectives in public 
works projects. The saving of lives was central to coastal protection schemes and to 
designing for seismic safety. At one time the deaths caused by North Sea flooding and in 
earthquakes numbered into the hundreds and thousands. Now the fatalities can be orders 
of magnitude smaller and the objective in design has moved away from personal safety to 
maintaining economic viability. The inclusion of sustainability into the goals and 
objectives of a project introduces a possible conflict if the Brundtland Commission 
definition of sustainability, namely, “Meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” is accepted (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987). One view of civil engineering 
work, especially of public works, is that the project changes the world for the better. Such 
changes have long term effects that will impact future generations in often unpredictable 
ways. There is no doubt that the civil engineer must obtain an understanding of the 
application of the Brundtland Commission definition to the project. The definition as a 
statement of general purpose is a splendid goal, but in order to proceed to professional 
decision-making, specific objectives, usually expressed as quantitative attainment 
measures, have to be stated. The civil engineer has to be fully involved in the discussions 
that lead to these measures and consequently has to be widely informed on topics beyond 
the technical..   
 
There seems to have been a concentration of effort in the twentieth century to make 
professional protocols more and more applicable. They have become more complete, 
detailed, and apparently more rational. Specifications have lengthened to include 
additional safety measures and there appears to have been an attempt to make the 
protocols cover all eventualities. Towards the end of the century the difficulty of 
satisfying this latter intention became apparent. More recently, the relationship of the 
protocols to the realities they purport to represent began to be discussed. Common 
measures, real information and data have begun to intrude into the professional decision-
making. Immediately difficulties arise involving the marriage of real and nominal information as well as some of the assumptions underlying the models used: for example, 
the choice of discounting factor if life-cycle analysis is attempted. It is possible that the 
situation is approaching that in other branches of engineering where the owner establishes 
a requirement specification for a product that includes legal and social restrictions, and 
seeks bids for the supply. This approach invites a design-build arrangement that may not 
be popular in some communities. Irrespective of the extent that the profession moves 
towards this arrangement, there is a necessity to predict future performance and thus make 
firm statements about the safety, economics, sustainability and behavior of a project. Such 
a move towards realism is incorporated in contemporary performance design, but the 
extent to which better results are achieved is not always clear. 
 
 
4. Advocacy and surprise 
 
Before decisions can be made by the engineer of record an unambiguous understanding of 
the objectives must be constructed. The owner is an enthusiast for the initial goals of the 
scheme but these can be varied and added to by the input of stakeholders. These 
participants have advocacy stances that can influence a decision scheme that seeks a 
solution satisfying the objectives and constraints. However, other concerns may exist 
which have to be identified by the engineer. Inasmuch as these concerns had not become 
apparent in the initial engagement with the owner, the inputs of the stakeholders can be 
considered surprising by the engineer. A common model for these situations is required 
which may appear as a constraint on the solutions that satisfy the objectives. 
 
A responsibility of the engineer of record is to identify without ambiguity the objectives of 
the project and potential unexpected and surprising outcomes. Such identification is 
evident in (C) in Fig.1. The owners and stakeholders are likely to provide much of the 
evidence for these objectives, constraints and outcomes. These participants are often 
advocates for particular, and often conflicting, outcomes and actions.  Occasionally the 
disputes are settled sharply in favor of one side. A case in point was the two barriers 
proposed by the Corps of Engineers between the east end of Lake Pontchartrain and the 
Mississippi (Heiberg 2007).  These barriers would have closed when a flood surge 
threatened New Orleans and environs. This was an advocacy stance by the Corps. A 
contrary stance was taken by Save Our Wetlands, Inc. in the role of protecting 
environmental features that would have been threatened by the use of the barriers. The 
matter was decided in the courts and the barriers were not built. This type of clear cut 
resolution is unusual and compromise between the goals of the owner and the views of the 
stakeholders has to be made. The engineer of record must ensure that the terms of the 
compromise are clear, and, if possible, expressed in a quantitative manner.  
 
The intrusion of advocates into the pre-design discussions may thus be regarded as a 
blessing to the engineer of record. In this way issues aired and underlying assumptions 
questioned are usually dealt with. Essentially the engineer is provided with the concerns of 
relevant stakeholders without having to seek them and hence avoid subsequent surprises. 
This participation of the broader community as represented by stakeholders and their 
advocacy is a creature of the last sixty years. Prior to then the owners established their goals by authoritative command and took little account of other interests. This certainly 
made it easier for the engineers of record of that time inasmuch as they were in no doubt 
about the source and instructions of their brief. As an example, the location of 
transportation routes, once decided, was enforced by laws such as eminent domain. 
Therefore, the engineer of record on a critical bridge had a purely technical view of the 
work. Today a decision about a major crossing of the Columbia River on Interstate 5 
between Oregon and Washington states has been mulled over for twenty years whilst the 
views of stakeholders on bicycle lanes, pedestrian access, bus routes, mass transit 
commitments, access to adjacent communities and the visual appearance have been 
considered. Even with the access of contemporary stakeholders to the market place of 
ideas, a serious problem occurs when concerns are not evident before final objectives are 
established. In every completed project there are outcomes which were not anticipated in 
the design. In most cases they are not serious, but, in others, changes in operations have to 
be made to accommodate these concerns. A case in point exists in changes in operation of 
hydro-electric schemes to provide for the enhanced passage of fish. These requirements 
were not considered in the design stage and only became evident in early operations. Stage 
(C) of Fig. 1 would be a critical phase for a search for surprising potential situations. This 
is where the engineer is urged to “think outside the box”. It is suggested here that the 
engineer should normally proceed in a manner which ensures that potential surprises are 
identified and decisions made about their inclusion in the final decision-making. Such 
examination would happen whilst steps (C) and (D) are considered. 
 
There will always be a small chance of any surprising situation occurring but not every 
unlikely situation is surprising. A usual statistical example is of a  toss of a coin where the 
coin finishes on its edge. This is contrasted with being dealt a hand of cards. The coin can 
be made to such a thickness that the probability of landing on the edge is the same as 
receiving any hand of cards. However any random hand of cards is without surprise, 
where as the coin landing on its edge is indeed surprising. The difference is associated 
with the probabilities of the alternatives and the extent to which a particular outcome is 
interesting to us. In the case of the cards the alternatives are the same as the hand dealt, 
but in the case of the coin they are each near 0.5 and very different to the chances of the 
coin landing on edge. Weaver (1948) developed a measure of surprise, A(X), at the 
occurrence of outcome X that accounts for these differences, namely, 
 
          E(P) 
       A (X) = ------            (2) 
           P(X) 
 
where  E(P) is the expected value of  the probabilities of all outcomes  and P(X) the 
probability of the outcome of interest, X. When the hand of cards is considered the 
numerator and denominator are equal and the measure of surprise is one. When the coin 
toss is considered there are three outcomes and therefore E(P) is approximately one-half 
and the probability of the coin landing on edge is 10
-n  where n>>1. Then the measure of 
surprise is of order 10
n. Thus a small value of A(X) denotes small surprise compared to a 
high value. Note that any degree of severity of the consequence of an outcome is not 
considered in the definition of Eq. (2).  
In considering the level of surprise associated with failure use is made of Equation (1) 
where P(F) is the actual probability of failure and not the nominal value. Two outcomes 
are possible and therefore the numerator is approximately unity if P(F) is small and the 
denominator is P(F) = 10
-n, with n>0. The measure of surprise is then approximately 10
n.. 
The engineer can construct a personal surprise scale based on professional experience. For 
instance in considering truss bridges of the type that failed on Interstate 35 in Minneapolis 
values of n between 3 and 4 may be appropriate, and in the case of long floating concrete 
pontoon bridges that exist in Washington State a figure slightly larger than one could be 
used in the light of the failure of two of the six bridges built there.. In this way an engineer 
can construct a personal scale of surprise such as shown in Table 1. 
 
          
n  Linguistic Surprise 
______________________ 
0          No surprise 
1  Not surprising 
3  Mildly surprising 
5  Definite surprising 
7  A miracle 
______________________ 
 
      Table 1. Relationship between failure and surprise 
 
It is unlikely that the surprise level can be computed with useful accuracy, but it is 
possible to consider the order of the surprise by comparing the chances of an identifiable 
event with those revealed by advocacy groups or by conventional models. A situation that 
has a low surprise level invites inclusion into the decision scheme. High levels of surprise 
call for professional judgment. The engineer of record may have to deal with hypothetical 
events raised by advocacy positions or by normal professional concerns. For instance, the 
2011 Christchurch earthquake of Feb. 22 resulted in very high local vertical accelerations 
(up to 2.2 g). Such high values had seldom been experienced elsewhere and certainly not 
in New Zealand. Although code writers had considered including high vertical 
accelerations, there was little evidence to suggest that they would occur. The occurrence 
was indeed a great surprise. Now the codes will be rewritten and the question of their 
inclusion will be faced with available local evidence but still with the knowledge of the 
global rarity. The likelihood of the accelerations will be less surprising, but still surprising. 
The same worries occur in the Pacific Northwest where the Cascadia subduction zone runs 
just offshore from Washington and Oregon. The evidence concerning the last massive 
earthquake there is largely derived from the Japanese tsunami literature. The earthquake 
was at about magnitude 9 and occurred in the year 1700. The question now arises about 
the extent that a future, similar event should be catered for in codes. All experts agree that 
the event will occur but the spread of recurrence dates makes for a very uncertain 
environment for the engineers to make important and potentially costly decisions. One 
approach is to identify the danger and attempt to introduce resilience into the design 
scheme with the intention of preserving both lives and fortunes.  
Surprise is neither place nor time invariant. In spite of the fact that an aircraft had struck 
the Empire State Building, it would have been reasonable for the engineer of record for 
the World Trade Center to consider that probability to be unlikely and surprising. Placed 
in the same situation today the surprise level would have dropped and the event would be 
considered as more likely. Thus surprise changes with experience, an issue which is 
relevant to an engineer’s use of models. Also, the same scenario in different locations can 
excite different levels of surprise. Ice hanging over the entrance to a tunnel often can exist 
in the cold mountains at 5,000 ft. elevation. This is not a surprising event.  The same 
condition at sea level in a damp, but occasionally cold, climate would be surprising. In 
both cases freeing of the ice and crushing of a vehicle could occur. However, the attitude 
of the responsible engineers addressing the same problem, but located 100 miles apart, 
could be different.  
 
 
The engineer interacts with the contractor in stages (F) and (G) in Fig. 1.As construction 
proceeds surprises occur. These are particularly evident at the foundation stage and call for 
decisions by the engineer of record that respect the contract documents and the opinions of 
the contractor. Some surprises call for significant changes. For instance, confidence 
existed in prior geotechnical studies that showed that solid rock existed at the proposed 
foundation of a two-pin arch bridge. Excavations revealed that every borehole had struck a 
sizeable rock and that a viable foundation did not exist. In the light of this the bridge was 
changed to a three-pin arch. The level of high surprise provided by this situation is 
unusual but changing construction requires continuing alertness by the engineer of record 
to a possible need to change the model being used. Decision (G) in Fig. 1 dates the 
completion of the constructed project and determines whether any penalties for late 
completion or rewards for early finishing are exercised. These are not occasions for 
surprising any of the concerned parties. 
 
Surprising events may be trivial in consequences, and if not so may be beneficial or 
adverse. The actual foundation weakness of the arch bridge previously discussed could 
have as easily been reversed. More satisfactory foundation material could have been 
found. Just because an event is surprising there is no necessity that it be serious, beneficial 
or important. The engineer of record will pay attention to surprising events that have 
important consequences. This suggests that a combination of consequences and the 
measure of surprise in Equation (2) be constructed and termed “shock”. 
 
 
 
5. Complexity 
 
Complexities will be generated by the model used by the engineer as a representation of 
reality. The model will be constructed to attain an objective. For instance, if interest is in 
motion of heavenly bodies then two obvious models exist. The Ptolemy model of wheels 
and gears is geometrically complex but intellectually simple; the Newtonian one of 
gravity is geometrically simple but intellectually challenging. Both will meet the objective but the talents required of the modeler will be very different. The selection of 
the model is critical. The engineer can build an analytic theoretical model that represents 
the features that will be encountered and yet that model may be of little value. It may be 
difficult to solve and contain uncertainties in the constituencies and connections.  It can 
be described as too complex. A definition of the adjective “complex” in the Shorter 
Oxford  English Dictionary (2002) is “Intricate, not easily analysed or disentangled, 
complicated”. It is perhaps unfortunate that the dictionary associates intricacy with 
complexity. If “intricate” is taken to mean that something consists of many parts, it may 
or may not be difficult to disentangle. From an engineering view the idea of entanglement 
means that as the complexity of a model increases, the more difficult it will be to obtain 
useful information for decision-making, A contributing factor is that the limits of human 
understanding reduces as the number of constituents in a complex model increases. 
Miller (1956) has suggested a number of seven and this could well become a limit for the 
decision maker. From a practical viewpoint the engineer is required to establish a mental 
model or construct in which the system is limited in the number of constituents. Even 
with this limitation the problem may still be complex. However, a systematic reduction of 
the problem into subsets or subsystems, where this is possible, can make both 
understanding and solution easier. This is the reason why the concept of responsibility 
discussed below has been split into several categories. 
 
Rational deliberation in decision making appears to produce the most satisfactory choices 
when the number of constituents is three or less, unconscious thought or intuition, where 
there is an absence of rational deliberation, may be preferable in decision-making when 
more constituents exist (Dijksterhuis, et al. 2006; Gigerenzer 2007). Information entropy 
levels will tend to increase as the number of constituents increases. Low entropy is an 
indicator that the few constituencies and connections are amenable to careful analysis 
from which useful outcomes can be expected. Precision becomes elusive and dependence 
on experience, memory and intuition becomes valid when more constituents, higher 
entropy and uncertainty exist, Zadeh (1973) captured this separation in the following 
manner: 
 
  Essentially,  our  contention  is  that  the  conventional  quantitative 
techniques of system analysis are intrinsically unsuited for dealing 
with  humanistic  systems  or,  for  that  matter,  any  system  whose 
complexity is comparable to that of humanistic systems. The basis 
for  this  contention  rests  on  what  may  be  called  the  principle  of 
incompatibility. Stated informally, the essence of the principle is that 
as the complexity of a system increases, the ability to make precise 
and yet significant statements about the behavior diminishes until a 
threshold  is  reached  beyond  which  precision  and  significance  (or 
relevance) become almost mutually exclusive characteristics. 
 
However, it is not only a matter of the degree of sparseness of the components of a 
system. Different network architectures reveal surprisingly different properties (Barabasi 
2002; Watts 2003).  
 An examination of Fig. 1 reveals that the civil engineer will have to deal with humanistic 
as well as technical complexity. The approach where many constituents and connections 
exist and where analysis may be of small significance seems to be at odds with the 
extensive literature on optimization in decision making. Such analysis would only seem 
to be fruitful when few constituents are involved. However, it is possible that these 
analyses may be valuable as confirmatory evidence and as an examination for omissions, 
even when the decision is made intuitively (Gigerenzer 2007). 
 
The vagueness inherent in complex and humanistic matters is often alleviated by the 
establishment of protocols. For instance the managerial complexity of discretionary 
railroad gauges in the 19
th century was clarified by national laws that established  
standard gauges, Much of civil engineering is constrained by such protocols and 
professional engineers have to not only accept them, but also have the responsibility to 
make sure that the other participants in Fig. 1 are aware of the limitations and constraints 
that they place on objectives, and hence decisions. These protocols come in the form of 
laws, codes and regulations, and it is difficult to imagine the complexities that would 
exist without them. The extension of codes of practice in the last century can be partially 
attributed to an effort to standardize practice and with the resulting uniformity, reduce 
complexity in design and construction. The movement towards performance based design 
may be a step to reduce the uniformity induced by obligatory codes. 
 
6. The nature of responsibility 
 
Any decision has associated responsibilities. The concept of responsibility has several 
different though related meanings. Klein (1995) suggests four: causal responsibility, legal 
responsibility, moral responsibility and role responsibility. “To be causally responsible 
for a state of affairs is to bring it about either directly or indirectly. … To be legally 
responsible is to fulfil the requirements for accountability under the law. ..  The term 
‘moral responsibility’ covers (i) the having of a moral obligation and (ii) the fulfilment of 
the criteria for deserving blame or praise.”  Finally, role responsibility refers to “the 
duties … which are attached to particular professional or societal roles.” (Klein 1995). 
All four concepts apply to the professional involvement of engineers in decision-making.  
Broadly they can be summarised as responsibility for doing something, responsibility to 
someone or some body, and the moral state of being responsible. The decision-maker has 
both responsibilities and also an obligation to behave responsibly. Klein’s categorisation 
can be expanded as follows: 
 
Causal responsibility is the responsibility for doing something. Often, many people are 
involved in a decision, but ultimately there is only one owner responsible for that 
decision. The owner might be an individual such as the engineer of record, or a defined 
group of people such as a committee. This is the unit responsible for making the decision. 
Accordingly, this is also the unit accountable or liable if the decision was poorly made.  
 
Someone has to be responsible for carrying out whatever actions have been decided on. 
Very often it will be the decision-maker, perhaps the engineer of record. In other 
circumstances the decision-maker will be acting within a framework which  gives authority to the decision-maker and also takes responsibility for subsequent actions. A 
judge, for instance, might sentence a person to imprisonment, but the legislative and 
administrative framework within which the judge is operating will take responsibility for 
subsequent actions. Therefore, there are two distinct responsibilities involved: 
responsibility for making the decision, whose results must be given to the body 
authorising the decision-maker, and responsibility for taking the results of the decision 
forward to achieve some action. Both are important. One cannot exist without the other 
for a proper decision-making framework. The important thing is not to confuse 
responsibility for decision with responsibility for action. 
 
There is also a causal responsibility for providing appropriate information and advice. 
This relates closely to role responsibility, discussed below. The role of the engineer is not 
always that of the decision-maker. 
 
Legal responsibility. “Legal” is used here in a broad sense of accountability. A decision-
maker is authorised to make the decision by an authority, who again might be either an 
individual or a group. The decision-maker is responsible to someone. Here again the need 
arises for a defined framework within which the decision must sit – “framework” is used 
here to mean an administrative entity having responsibility, authority and ownership. The 
decision-maker is responsible to the framework that provides the mandate for making the 
decision. Thus, in authorising the decision-maker, the framework also takes on 
responsibility for the decision. In turn, the framework is responsible to a wider 
framework, such as finance providers or society. Causal and legal responsibility can be 
thought of as two related ideas: responsibility upwards, and authorisation downwards in a 
hierarchy.  
 
The decision-maker can be an agent of the authorising framework for that decision. The 
authorising framework may itself be an agent for some higher framework such as a board 
of directors. An agent will normally have a limited range of autonomy – a limited 
mandate for action.  Any decision-making must be within this authorised range, within 
which the decision-maker has authorisation to decide or act. 
 
Moral responsibility and role responsibility. In the context of professional decision-
making, moral and role responsibilities are not readily separated. Both relate to the way 
one acts, or should act. They can be thought of as personal and professional obligations 
respectively. Thus “moral” is used broadly. It can be seen as an ethical issue, as an 
imperative for a professional engineer to behave ethically in what is done, but beyond 
traditional ethics there is also an imperative for an engineer to do a job as well as possible 
within the constraints surrounding it, such as time or funding. In this case, the 
requirement is to make as good a decision as possible, where the word “good” is related 
to a moral imperative. Here there is a need for the engineer to be as good at the job as 
possible. This means attention to the real needs of the problem, and also to the need for 
the engineer to be competent and informed. Beyond the way in which a good result is 
helped by the attributes of the engineer, there is the further issue of what might be meant 
by a good result – a high-quality design or completed artefact, for instance. The word 
“quality” is a useful alternative to “good” in an engineering context. Be that as it may, there is a need to consider the skills required of an engineer in order to make a good 
decision. 
 
There is also an obligation for the professional to understand and abide by the 
requirements of accountability referred to above, and also to be clear about the objective 
of any decision. In this respect there are two modes of proceeding which could be called 
the rational and the humanist. The first is objective. Besides being clear as to the aim of 
the decision and its surrounding constraints, the engineer needs to have all the necessary 
information to hand, which may require prior analysis of basic data, and an understanding 
of the uncertainties contained in the information. A common measure is necessary for 
comparing alternatives. 
 
In parallel with this, a humanist approach is necessary. This is holistic and largely 
unconscious information processing, “feeling” what a result should be subjectively rather 
than objectively processing the information to hand.. Jung contrasted thinking and feeling 
as two different and complementary means of dealing with information (Jung 1964). It 
has been shown that for decisions involving simple choice, a rational method of 
proceeding produces better results than a humanist, but where the nature of the choice is 
complex, the reverse is true (Dijksterhuis et al 2006; Gigerenzer 2007). It has been shown 
that people with brain damage such that they cannot empathise and their emotional 
reactions are damaged in some way, cannot make any decisions even though they might 
in other way, such as analytical skills,  be intelligent and capable. The implication of this 
is that emotions are involved in decision-making (Damasio 2003). 
 
It is normally the case that engineering education deals carefully with rational 
approaches, but not at all to the same extent with the humanist. This might lead to the 
unhelpful situation of an engineer actively seeking to suppress intuitive leadings with the 
thought that somehow they are not “proper”. One can learn intuitive approaches, of 
course.  They can be picked up by experience, but there is a danger here that unguided (or 
unthinking) experience can also narrow the bounds of what is seen as normal professional 
activity. Research shows that intuitive approaches can be learnt (Goleman 1996), but they 
need both practice and a will to apply them. 
 
One disadvantage of any use of intuition in decision-making is that the results are a 
personal thing, and it is difficult to form a defensible audit trail, which would often be 
required in a potentially litigious situation. But we are not arguing for the sole use of 
intuitive decision-making. Rather, we see the rational and humanist approaches as 
complementing each other in an environment of mutual support. This position could also 
be stated the other way around: neither the rational nor the humanist approach to 
decision-making would be adequate alone where a complex decision has to be made. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The discussion of responsibilities revolves around labels, titles and actions. These are 
associated with individuals, organizations and the interactions between them. Essentially 
this reflects the modeling that has been accepted. The involved cast has been identified in a reductionist manner and the associated models are constructed on that basis. In this way 
the description of the entities and connections is established. This non-causative state is 
like a study of kinematics; it tells you locations and motions without providing any sense 
of causes for getting there or for going elsewhere. These next steps are within the 
province of dynamics. Fig. 1 is the demonstrative model used here and shows the cast as 
entities and the connections that are presumed to exist as lines. The causative part is 
indicated vectorally by arrows and various actions. This is the chosen representation of a 
holistic reality, namely the establishment of a functioning facility. The responsibilities are 
assigned to the actors but there are other entities, like the law, which, as illustrated by the 
Lake Pontachartrain barrier example, can stop the intended activity. A question in 
modeling is how far to go in establishing entities and connections. Rodriguez-Nikl and 
Brown (2011) have provided a scheme that depends on decision invariance and accounts 
for the limited number ideas that can be accepted in thinking and rational decision-
making. This can help to establish the model boundaries. However, the success of this 
procedure depends on the inclusion of all critical entities and their connections. Any 
omission invites surprises. A search for omissions suggests the necessity of a holistic 
overview of the reductionist model. This is the “big picture” action which has so many 
advocates A claim here is that both the reductionist and holistic views are necessary in 
any successful decision scheme. The reductionist view identifies obvious responsible 
parties and their connections, the holistic one provides insight into what might have been 
missed.  
 
The choice of model can provide complexity to the scheme. This model driven 
complexity is a creature of human actions and can be similarly reduced. An example 
provided here is the introduction of protocols. There is a chance of surprise if the efforts 
at simplicity omit critical entities. Again it may be necessary to impose a holistic 
overview to detect these omissions. The actor with a mandate to carry out these holistic 
over views is the engineer of record for whom it is an understood responsibility. 
 
Uncertainty haunts all stages of decision-making. The goals of the owner have to be 
translated into definite objectives and there will be doubts in the mind of the engineer of 
record about the completeness of this operation. The various concerns of stakeholders are 
often difficult to convert into sharp resolution. Again it will not always be clear that the 
engineer has caught the full intentions of these advocates. Protocols are intended to 
resolve many ambiguities but it is understood that codes and regulations can be variously 
interpreted and are therefore subject to tests in the actual use of a facility or by court 
action. The model chosen to represent the critical aspects of reality has uncertainties 
associated with the entities and connections selected, their properties and processes, and 
incomplete information on loads, materials, geometries and other conditions. The use of 
computer methods can provide some control in these matters but there is always a 
possible conflict between precision and accuracy. Usually precision is of little interest to 
the civil engineer. Although the moments, shears and hence stresses in a continuous 
bridge beam can be predicted with precision for prescribed code loads, prescribed 
material properties, and stated geometries and support conditions, the engineer knows 
that these are but models of real conditions. The resulting answers are useful guides but 
no significant decision will be made that depends on purportedly precise results. In all these concerns about uncertainty the civil engineer has to keep an open mind about the 
various ingredients of the decision mix. A balanced approach is required in which all 
aspects are given consideration. Elms (1985, 1992) has treated this required balance 
under the title of a principle of consistent crudeness. The intention is to attain a state 
whereby all significant issues receive appropriate attention. 
 
Within the decision making framework from inception to completion of a project such as 
shown in Fig. 1, the engineer moves between different roles and responsibilities. These 
apply to both making engineering decisions and contributing to decisions made by others. 
Good work and consistency are required in the whole project. The different roles and 
contexts demand versatility and, insofar as the problems are complex and demand 
working and communicating with others who have very different backgrounds and 
objectives, they require wide ranging skills beyond the technical competence previously 
believed to be sufficient for successful engineering practice. It is therefore a 
responsibility of professional engineers to understand the need for such skills and to 
acquire and maintain them, as well as to understand the complexity of the environment 
within which they work. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The concern of this paper is with the responsibilities of civil engineers, and particularly 
the engineer of record, in making professional decisions. These responsibilities include 
the interactions with owners, stakeholders, political and legal operations, contractors and 
protocols as especially expressed in codes of practice. There will be complexity and 
uncertainty in such decision procedures and chances of surprises, whether beneficial or 
harmful, will exist. These matters have to be included in any professional decision 
making procedure. 
 
This paper has demonstrated the need to bring subjective skills into decision making, as 
well as a need to understand complexity and how it can be handled. The necessity of 
understanding clearly the problem to be addressed, often in unfamiliar and difficult 
contexts, has been demonstrated. Often these problems are not susceptible to 
conventional approaches and nowadays the competent civil engineer has responsibility to 
be skillful in meeting these broader needs. Clearly these matters have implications for 
engineering education. This paper does not attempt to provide definitive answers. 
However, four general requirements are suggested, namely, 
 
  to understand the framework of models within which the engineer thinks and 
operates  
 
  to acquire broad systems skills where the holistic thinking complements the linear 
causal threads of traditional rational approaches 
 
  to develop skills in subjective thinking as an essential part of decision making in 
complex environments  
  to have good communication skills not only with other engineers but with the 
broader, involved communities. 
 
These requirements can be thought of as defining the nature of the professionally 
responsible contemporary engineer. 
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